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Gratt. (Va.) 263 (1877); Rest., Trusts § 258 (ib) (1935); cf. Chillingworthv. Chambers, [1896] Ch. 685; McCarlinv. Traphagen,43 NJ. Eq. 323, 1i Ati. 156 (1887) (primary liability). These considerations of benefit and comparative fault are irrelevant,
however, when both parties have acted in bad faith. Berger, Contribution between
Tortfeasors, 9 Ind. L. J. 229 (1934); Harper, Torts § 303 (1933); Rest., Trusts § 258
(2), comment g (1935). In such cases neither contribution nor indemnity will be allowed. Atl'y-Gen'l v. Wilson, Craig & P. 1, 28 (i84o); Girod v. Pargoud, ii La. Ann.
329 (1856); Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige (N.Y.) 607 (1836). There is no precise definition of bad faith, but the courts seem to require an intention to misappropriate or
diminish the trust fund. Compare Girod v. Pargond, iiLa. Ann. 329 (1856) with Patteson v. Horsley, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 263 (1877); see 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § io8i
(4 th ed. 1918); i6 Minn. L. Rev. 73 (1931).
If the Court of Appeals had disregarded the contract in the instant case, it would
have found the broker entitled either to contribution or to indemnity, since there was
no bad faith involved. See Steele v. Leopold, 135 App. Div. 247, 258, 12o N.Y.S. 569,
577 (igog). The court seemed to regard the guardian as more culpable, perhaps because
she was the "prime mover" of the improper transactions and because the broker was
not in a fiduciary relation with the wards. But it is difficult to see how the guardian
could be considered substantially at fault; nor did she receive such benefit from the
breach as would entitle the broker to indemnity on that account. Cf. Patteson v.
Horsley, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 263 (I877); see Re Partington,57 L. T. R. (N.S.) 654 (1887);
Chillingworthv. Chambers, [i896] 3 Ch. 685. On the whole, each party was so remiss in
his duty to the beneficiary as to make it equitable that the ultimate liability be shared
equally; it was a case calling for contribution rather than indemnity. It is probable,
therefore, that the broker would not have been granted indemnity if the court had
applied equitable principles instead of considering the contract controlling. But whether the application of equitable principles would have led the court to grant contribution or indemnity, a decision based on those principles would have been preferable to
the court's recognition of a contract for indemnity in a case where the impropriety
of the contemplated investments was so clear. See Delafield v. Barret, 245 App. Div.
33, 279 N. Y. S. 445 (1935).
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Unemployment Insurance-Due Process-First Test of Constitutionality of New
York Compulsory Law-[New York].-The New York Compulsory Unemployment
Insurance Act (N.Y.L. 1935, c. 468) specifically excludes farm laborers, members of
the employer's immediate family, workers for non-profit organizations and government workers. N.Y.L. 1935, c. 502. Otherwise, the law applies to all industries in
which four or more persons are employed. Every employer is subject to a payroll tax,
the proceeds of which are deposited with the United States Treasury in the unemployment insurance fund established by the federal Social Security Act. 49 Stat. part I,
p. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-1305 (i935). The payroll tax is the only source of
contributions to the fund. N.Y.L. 1935, § 529. Penalties are provided for employers
who seek to pay their contributions by deductions from their employees' wages. § 528.
Provision has been made for future classification of employers and for graduation of
the payroll tax according to their individual unemployment records. § 518. Section
504 of the act makes qualified provisions for benefits to employees who have been law-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
fully discharged for misconduct, who have voluntarily withdrawn from their employment or who have lost their employment because of strikes or lockouts. The plaintiffs, employers subject to the act, attacked the law as a violation of the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions, and contended that the prohibition
against deductions constitutes an undue limitation of the freedom of contract and
that the tax scheme is arbitrary. One division of the supreme court held the entire act
unconstitutional; another division held the statute constitutional except as to the provisions of § 504. Held, the entire act is constitutional; it is neither arbitrary, discriminatory nor unreasonable. It is a proper exercise of either the tax or police powers.
Chamberlain v. Andrews, New York Times, April 16, 1936, p. 16 (N.Y. Ct. Appeals,
April i, 3936).
This case affords refreshing relief from the recent tendency of both federal and state
courts to invalidate social legislation. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Ry., 295
U.S. 330 (1935); People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, 27o N.Y. 233, 200 N.E. 799 (1936);
see the Nation, April 29, 1936, p. 534. Testing the constitutionality of legislation involves a determination of whether the ends sought to be achieved by the legislation
are permissible and whether the means chosen have a fair relation to the ends. See
Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 4o Harv. L. Rev.
943 (1927). That the object of unemployment insurance, the alleviation of the distress
of unemployment, is permissible within the traditional scope of the police power seems
scarcely debatable. Unemployment, both as a permanent and an emergency problem,
has created serious social and personal maladjustments. If unemployment cannot be
substantially prevented, the state must see that adequate provisions are made for the
unemployed. See Lambert, Compulsory Unemployment Insurance and Due Process
of Law, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 146 (1932); Elliot and Merrill, Social Disorganization, c. XIV
(1934). The conclusion of the New York court that the means chosen by the legislature to solve this critical problem are not arbitrary seems clearly correct. True, the
employer and employee are deprived of some freedom of contract and the employer is
subjected to a new duty to contribute to the support of employees whose employment has ended. But such limitations of employers' rights are not unknown. See
ante p. 657. Under the workmen's compensation acts, for instance, contributions
are exacted from employers to compensate employees for injuries received under circumstances which at common law would not have made the employer liable. Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). The employer in both cases is compelled
to pay into the common fund, not because he is personally at fault, but because there
is a growing belief that industry should assume a fair share of the burden confronting
industrial employees. The provisions in the New York law placing on employers the
cost of unemployment find their parallel in other situations in which the property of
one class is taken and put into a common fund for the use of another class. See Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) (upholding an assessment on banks for a depositors' guaranty fund); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. U.S., 263 U.S. 456 (1924) (upholding the provisions of an act which required carriers to contribute to a fund to be
used for loans to carriers); State v. Cassiry, 22 Minn. 312 (1875) (approving a tax on
saloonkeepers to be used in maintaining an asylum for inebriated persons). Whether
the unemployment insurance acts represent the use of the taxing power or the police
power-and the court in the instant case refused to decide this issue-would appear to
be immaterial, for both "powers" are subject to the limitations of the due process
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clause and the exercise of either is subject to the test of reasonableness. Maggs, The
Constitution and the Recovery Legislation: The R61es of Document, Doctrine and
Judges, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1934); but see 3 Law and Contemporary Problems
138 (1936).
Wills-Subsequent Conveyance as Revocation or Ademption where Testator Reacquires Property-[Illinois].-A testator devised generally all his real and personal
property to the defendant. Two years later, the testator conveyed the land here in
question to the defendant who subsequently reconveyed it to the testator. The testator died owning this land without republishing his will. In a suit for partition, his heirs
contended that the conveyance revoked the will as to this land, even though it was subsequently reacquired, and that it passed to them by descent. From a decree dismissing
the complaint, the heirs appealed. Held, affirmed. The conveyance did not impliedly
revoke the general devise where the testator later reacquired the property. Strang v.
Day, i99 N.E. 263 (Ill. 1935).
It was a familiar common law rule that after-acquired realty could not be devised.
Earl of Lincoln's Case, Freeman's Ch. R. 202 (1695); see Willis v. Watson, 5 Inl. 64
(1842). Thus, a conveyance of land already devised operated as a revocation of the
devise even though the testator reacquired the land. Marwood v. Turner,3 P. Win. 163
(1732); Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 258 (1823). As to personal property,
however, the common law was just the contrary; a sale of bequeathed personalty did
not work a revocation and if it was reacquired by the testator, it passed by the will.
Cogdell v. Cogdell, 3 S.C. Eq. 346 (18ii). The basis for the real property rule was removed by the Wills Act in England, and by similar legislation in the United States
permitting devises of after-acquired realty by making the will operate as of the testator's death, rather than as of the time of execution. I Vict., c. 26, § iii (1837); III. L.
1833, p. 315, Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 148, § i; Bordwell, Statute Laws of
Wills, I4 Iowa L. Rev. 187 (1929). Accordingly, in most jurisdictions today a conveyance of realty as well as of personalty does not revoke the devise and the property,
if reacquired, will pass under the will. Woolery v. Woolery, 48 Ind. 523 (1874); Morey
v. Sohier, 63 N.H. 507, 3 Atl. 363 (i886); Gregg v. McMillan, 54 S.C. 378, 32 S.E. 447
(x889). Despite such legislation, however, Illinois has adopted the anomalous position
of permitting reacquired personal property to pass under the will (In re Austin, 243
Ill. App. 386 (1927)), but of retaining the common law rule as to specific devises of
realty. Phillippe v. Clevenger, 239 Ill. 117, 87 N.E. 858 (igog). It would seem that the
court in the latter case applied the technical common law rule of revocation to a situation for which it had been rendered inapplicable by statute. i Page, Wills § 467 (2d
ed. 1926); Costigan, Cases on Wills 363, note 42 (2d ed. J929). Had the conveyed
property never been reacquired, it of course would not have passed by the will, not because the conveyance had worked a revocation, but because the testator did not own
the property at his death. The failure of a devise or bequest because of the lack of such
ownership is, strictly speaking, known as ademption, not revocation. i Page, Wills
§ 456 (2d ed. 1926). There is confusion in the use of these terms, largely because under
either theory the result is the same if the property is not reacquired. 26 Mich. L. Rev.
124 (1927).

But nicety in expression is essential to avoid technical difficulties. Where

the property is reacquired, the theory of revocation requires a republishing of the will
to pass the property by the device; under ademption, however, the property passes by

